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LAWYERS’ DEMOCRATIC DYSFUNCTION 
Leah Litman* 
ABSTRACT 
As part of the symposium on Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson’s Democracy and 
Dysfunction, this Article documents another source of the dysfunction that the authors 
observe—elite lawyers’ unwillingness to break ranks with other elite lawyers who 
participate in the destruction of various norms that are integral to a well-functioning 
democracy. These network effects eliminate the possibility of “soft” sanctions on norm 
violators such as withholding future professional advancement. Thus, rather than 
enforcing norms and deterring norm violations, the networks serve to insulate norm 
violators from any meaningful accountability. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Something is rotten in the United States.1 Over the last several years, 
academics and commentators from across the political spectrum have expressed 
varying degrees of concern about the health of the U.S. political system.2   Sandy  
Levinson   and   Jack   Balkin’s   recently   released   book,  
Democracy and Dysfunction, makes clear that the authors also harbor significant 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Don Herzog, 
Sandy Levinson, and David Pozen for helpful comments and conversations, and to Widad Diab 
(University of California, Irvine School of Law), Jared Looper (University of Michigan Law 
School), and Thomas Multari (University of California, Irvine School of Law) for helpful 
research assistance. 
 1.  Cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 4. 
 2.  See generally Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How We Lost Constitutional Democracy, 
in CAN IT HAPPEN HERE? AUTHORITARIANISM IN AMERICA 135 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2018); 
Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78, 
105–06 (2018); Richard Primus, The Republic in Long-Term Perspective, 177 U. MICH. L. REV. 
ONLINE 1, 22–23 (2018). 
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misgivings, if not fears, about the state of our constitutional republic.3 
Democracy and Dysfunction documents Levinson and Balkin’s 
correspondence over a period of several years, spanning the lead up to and first 
year of the Donald J. Trump presidency. The exchanges between the two focus 
primarily on diagnosing our constitutional system’s ailments, although some cover 
possible solutions.4 Levinson maintains that much of our political dysfunction is 
attributable to the Constitution itself.5 He explains that the Constitution’s systems 
for apportioning representation in the Senate and choosing presidents are both 
deeply undemocratic and skew political incentives in nefarious ways.6 Balkin, on 
the other hand, focuses more on subconstitutional defects, such as the difficulty of 
voting in the United States as well as the structure of mass media.7 
In this short symposium piece, I suggest there is another contributing force 
to the kinds of dysfunction that both of the authors observe. My addition is a 
friendly amendment to Balkin and Levinson’s diagnoses because the dynamic I 
describe could facilitate dysfunction that is attributable to the Constitution itself or 
to subconstitutional forces. The dynamic relates to a point that Levinson made in 
one of the authors’ exchanges. Levinson wrote: “I supported the filibuster of 
Justice Gorsuch’s nomination to the Supreme Court, even as I knew it would be 
fruitless,  
because I saw no reason for the Democrats to be ‘good sports’ with regard to 
stealing the seat that might well/should have gone to Merrick Garland.”8 
This passage is illuminating because it conveys Levinson’s fear that the 
Democrats will collaborate with President Trump and be “good sports” when it 
comes to judicial nominations. Levinson seems to view his own hope that 
Democrats will not cooperate as evidence of a defect in our constitutional order: 
“[T]he Constitution makes it so very difficult to achieve a genuine governing 
 
 3.  SANFORD LEVINSON & JACK M. BALKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DYSFUNCTION 2 (2019). 
 4.  Balkin and Levinson suggest many different categorizations for antidemocratic trends, 
including constitutional rot and constitutional crises. Id. at 73–82, 106–13 (distinguishing 
constitutional rot from constitutional crisis).  
 5.  See id. at 2. 
 6.  Id. at 12–13, 45–50. This point is in keeping with Levinson’s previous work. See 
generally SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (2d ed. 2011); CYNTHIA LEVINSON & 
SANFORD LEVINSON, FAULT LINES IN THE CONSTITUTION: THE FRAMERS, THEIR FIGHTS, AND 
THE FLAWS THAT AFFECT US TODAY (2017); SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 
CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE (2012); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR 
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE 
PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006). 
 7.  See LEVINSON & BALKIN,  supra note 3, at 29, 51–53. 
 8.  Id. at 121. 
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coalition that can, well, govern.”9 
I think this passage calls to mind something else—the inability of social and 
professional networks, and particularly elite lawyers, to hold their members 
accountable for facilitating the breakdown of norms that are integral to our 
constitutional system. Although political polarization makes it difficult for 
legislators to cooperate across the aisle, the network of elite lawyers still finds 
common ground with one another. This group likes to be “good sports” with one 
another.10 Elite circles of the legal profession seem deeply uncomfortable with 
doing anything that might hold other elite lawyers accountable for their disregard 
of various norms or principles. And the legal network’s unwillingness to hold its 
members accountable for breaching these norms partially contributes to the kind 
of dysfunction that Levinson and Balkin observe.11 
Consider some of the norms that the authors maintain are important to a 
functional system of constitutional governance: norms of political participation 
(such as allowing political opponents to vote) and norms related to political 
responsiveness (such as allowing the winners of an election to assume power or 
ensuring elections remain sufficiently democratic and responsive to the popular 
will).12 Levinson and Balkin express concern about antidemocratic measures, such 
as voter suppression, that undermine these norms.13 
Various elite lawyers have participated in these antidemocratic measures, 
and the network of elite lawyers has been unwilling to sanction them for it. That 
unwillingness eliminates one possible mechanism for upholding and enforcing 
these norms and others like them. The elite network’s discomfort with holding its 
members accountable for breaching norms shares some parallels with the parallel 
and overlapping phenomenon of being uncomfortable with calling someone a 
racist or with identifying racial discrimination by name.14 The hesitation to call 
someone or something racist sometimes stems from a feeling that calling someone 
a racist is as bad as being racist.15 It is a strange idea, but it shows up in media 
 
 9.  Id. at 122. 
 10.  I will focus, in this Article in particular, on elite lawyers who identify as progressive 
being good sports. 
 11.  This claim does not depend on the legal force of the arguments for or against breaking 
a particular norm or whether a particular action is legal or illegal. It focuses more on whether a 
lawyer is advocating for a course of conduct that is destructive to the functioning of a political 
democracy (such as suppressing votes) or is immoral (such as separating families to cause pain). 
 12.  See LEVINSON & BALKIN, supra note 3, at 70–73.  
 13.  See, e.g., id. at 136–37. 
 14.  John Blake, The Polite Way to Call Someone a Racist, CNN (Sept. 29, 2018), 
http://cnn.com/2018/09/29/us/polite-racism/index.html [https://perma.cc/K5FH-KEKS]. 
 15.  Id.  
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coverage, which often describes racism as racially tinged rather than as racist.16 It 
appears in politics, where leaders balk at criticizing other politicians for being 
racist.17 And it has shaped legal doctrines as well, including courts’ reluctance to 
say that government decisionmakers have acted on the basis of racism.18 
Both the discomfort with holding elite lawyers accountable for participating 
in the breakdown of important norms and the discomfort with identifying racists 
result in a zone of unaccountability.19 When social or professional networks refuse 
to hold their members accountable for their actions, the networks lose the ability 
to function as meaningful safeguards against the breakdown of norms.20 If 
anything, the existence of these  
networks makes it more difficult to protect the relevant norms—since the  
 
 
 
networks make it difficult to criticize people within the network who violate the 
norms.21 
The phenomenon of elite loyalty relates to the problem of political 
polarization that Balkin and Levinson write about.22 The two phenomena are 
similar insofar as political polarization makes it harder for the member of one 
political camp to reject a political ally who participated in the destruction of a 
norm.23 But the two phenomena are different because political polarization does 
 
 16.  Julia Craven, Media Euphemisms for ‘Racist’ Are Stupidly Tinged, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/media-trump-shithole-
racist_n_5a58f0dee4b04f3c55a23a07?guccounter=1 [https://perma.cc/T9YD-7HC6]; Marina 
Fang, Journalists Should Call Something Racist When It’s Racist, Associated Press Says, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/ entry/journalism-racist-racism-
reports_n_5c9e6245e4b0bc0daca861d7 [https://perma.cc/ 3ZLA-R699]. 
 17.  Paul Kane & Ed O’Keefe, Republicans Vote to Rebuke Elizabeth Warren, Saying She 
Impugned Sessions’s Character, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/02/07/republicans-vote-to-
rebuke-elizabeth-warren-for-impugning-sessionss-character/; Jessica A. Levinson, Snow White 
Was Flawed, and Other Truths About Rep. Ilhan Omar, HILL (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/457938-snow-white-was-flawed-and-other-truth s-
about-rep-ilhan-omar [https://perma.cc/H5FX-DCDD]. 
 18.  See infra text accompanying notes 98–108. 
 19.  See infra text following note 29 for definition. 
 20.  See Fang, supra note 16. 
 21.  See Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 
COLUM. L. REV. 915, 959 (2018). 
 22.  See id. at 958–59. 
 23.  Political polarization makes the idea of giving the opposing political side a win—and 
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not explain why individuals who identify with the opposite political party are 
unwilling to criticize a person who facilitated the breakdown of a norm.24 That 
behavior, instead, might plausibly be attributable to the network effects of 
belonging to a particularly small subset of the lawyerly community.25 Being a 
member of the small group of elite lawyers leads to familiarity with other members 
of the group, which makes it harder to view those fellow members as a destructive 
force in the world. Familiarity and insularity raise the stakes of uncomfortable 
dynamics within the group, and being a member of a network facilitates 
codependence on other network members and even an expectation of reciprocated 
loyalty. Together, these incentives create professional and personal pressures to 
stick by other members of the elite network of lawyers, including lawyers who 
have facilitated the destruction of important constitutional norms and thereby 
undermined a healthy, democratic constitutional order.26 
Part II of this Article lays the groundwork for the idea that lawyers who 
participate in the destruction of important constitutional norms or principles  
will never face meaningful accountability from other lawyers. Part II discusses the 
case study of former officials in the George W. Bush Administration who 
participated in the now-discredited enhanced interrogation (i.e., torture) program. 
Part III shows something similar is  
already happening with the Trump Administration officials who participated in the 
forced separation of families.27 There are already ongoing efforts to rehabilitate 
those officials, and in some cases, the lawyers involved in the program have 
already been promoted to other jobs.28 These case studies suggest that the 
community of elite lawyers is either unwilling or unable to discipline members for 
participating in the breakdown of our constitutional order.29 (For purposes of this 
Article, discipline or sanction means only withholding certain future government 
appointments and promotions from the lawyers—not imposing criminal sanctions 
or removing them from their current jobs or pursuing actions such as disbarment. 
Discipline or sanction might involve some degree of social shunning to the extent 
 
abandoning someone on one’s own political team—less appealing than it would be in a world 
without political polarization. See generally Jay J. Van Bavel & Andrea Pereira, The Partisan 
Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief, 22 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 213 (2018). 
 24.  Cf. id. at 214–15. 
 25.  See Thomas Baumgartner, Lorenz Götte, Rahel Gügler & Ernst Fehr, The Mentalizing 
Network Orchestrates the Impact of Parochial Altruism on Social Norm Enforcement, 33 HUM. 
BRAIN MAPPING 6, 1453 (2011) (outlining the phenomenon of parochial altruism, which the 
authors define as “a preference for altruistic behavior towards ingroup members”). 
 26.  See id. at 1467; see also Pozen & Fishkin, supra note 21, at 923.  
 27.  See infra Part III. 
 28.  See infra Part III. 
 29.  See infra Parts II, III. 
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that withholding public support counts as social shunning. But here, the terms refer 
only to withholding certain governmental appointments that amount to 
promotions.) Part IV concludes with some reflections about how this ethos of 
unaccountability appears in constitutional jurisprudence and why it is destructive 
to our constitutional order. 
The important point is not whether the specific decisions the lawyers made 
or the policies they defended are lawful or were lawful. Some perfectly lawful 
policies might nonetheless be morally abhorrent and destructive to a functional 
system of governance. Restricting the franchise and suppressing voter turnout 
might be legal (at least in some instances), but it is nonetheless antidemocratic. 
The President asking a foreign government to investigate a political opponent in 
order to politically and personally benefit the President (particularly when the 
country needs U.S. foreign aid or military assistance) may or may not violate 
federal election laws,30 but it is nonetheless deeply antithetical to a functioning 
system of government. Asking only whether  
 
something is illegal minimizes the potential stakes and obscures equally 
significant—if not more significant—issues. 
II. ENHANCED INTERROGATIONS 
In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Bush 
Administration launched several morally and legally dubious programs.31 Among 
them were the Administration’s use of so-called enhanced interrogation techniques 
on detainees who were held at Abu Ghraib prison or at various black sites outside 
of the United States.32 At the time, human rights experts argued that the enhanced 
interrogation techniques met accepted definitions of torture under international 
 
 30.  See Letter from Whistleblower to Sen. Richard Burr, Chairman, Select Comm. on 
Intelligence, and Rep. Adam Schiff, Chairman, Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence (Aug. 
12, 2019), https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20190812_-
_whistleblower_complaint_unclass.pdf [https://perma.cc/263C-PNZP] [hereinafter Letter from 
Whistleblower]; see also Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Trump, 
U.S., and President Zelenskyy, Ukr. (July 25, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/09/Unclassified09.2019.pdf [htt ps://perma.cc/69YS-TGYP]. 
 31.  Amna Akbar & Rupal Oza, “Muslim Fundamentalism” and Human Rights in an Age 
of Terror and Empire, in GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY AND COUNTER TERRORISM: HUMAN 
RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 152 (Margaret L. Satterthwaite & Jayne C. Huckerby eds., 2013); Amna 
Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. REV. 834, 842–44 (2015); Shirin 
Sinnar, The Lost Story of Iqbal, 105 GEO. L.J. 379, 383 (2016); Shirin Sinnar, Note, Patriotic 
or Unconstitutional? The Mandatory Detention of Aliens Under the USA Patriot Act, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 1419, 1420–21 (2003). 
 32.  S. Rep. No. 113-288, at 97, 133–34, 175 n.1054 (2014). 
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law; they also criticized the programs on moral grounds.33 Scores of lawyers were 
involved in these programs: They developed the legal justifications and defenses 
for enhanced interrogation, including bolstering the questionable idea that torture 
generates reliable information.34 
Around the time that the programs were discovered, and especially after the 
justifications for the programs were discredited with the benefit of hindsight, there 
were calls to sanction the officials involved. Websites argued that the lawyers 
involved in the program should be prosecuted or disbarred.35 Op-eds in major 
newspapers maintained that they “corrupted the law . . . g[a]ve cover to existing 
and plainly illegal policies,” and “authorized unspeakable acts.”36 Other op-eds 
called for the lawyers to be prosecuted,37 disbarred,38 or shunned by “Congress, 
 
 33.  Curtis Bradley, The Bush Administration and International Law: Too Much 
Lawyering and Too Little Diplomacy, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 71–72 (2009); 
Michael P. Scharf, International Law and the Torture Memos, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 321, 
345, 447 (2009); Those Who Authorize and Use CIA “Enhanced” Interrogation Tactics Risk 
Criminal Prosecution, PHYSICIANS HUM. RTS. (Aug. 2, 2007), https://phr.org/news/those-who-
authorize-and-use-cia-enhanced-interrogation-tactics-risk-criminal-prosecution/ 
[https://perma.cc/PBP6-QDTF].  
 34.  See infra text accompanying notes 47–56 (describing Justice Neil Gorsuch’s role in 
legitimating and legalizing the Bush Administration’s torture regime). 
 35.  See Kenneth J. Theisen & Stephanie Tang, The Truth About Torture: Why John Yoo 
Should Be Fired, Disbarred, and Prosecuted, WORLD CAN’T WAIT!, 
http://www.worldcantwait.net/index.php/97-organizers/kenneth-theisen/5767-the-truth- 
about-torture-why-john-yoo-should-be-fired-disbarred-and-prosecuted [https://perma. 
cc/9T6J-6QQ2]. 
 36.  There Were Orders to Follow, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/04/opinion/04fri1.html?scp=9&sq=%22John+C.+Yoo%22
&st=nyt. 
 37.  Will Bunch, Pa. Must Disbar War Criminal John Yoo—NOW!, PHILA. INQUIRER (May 
7, 2009), https://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/attytood/ 
Pennsylvania_and_Yoo_NOT_perfect_together.html; N.Y. Times Editorial Bd., Prosecute 
Torturers and Their Bosses, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/22/opinion/prosecute-torturers-and-their-bosses. html; 
Steve Sheppard, How the Torture Lawyers Broke the Law, and Why They Must Be Punished, 
FINDLAW (Mar. 1, 2010), https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/how-the-torture-
lawyers-broke-the-law-and-why-they-must-be-punished .html [https://perma.cc/2BHK-
GM8N]; Jon Wiener, Prosecute John Yoo, Says Law School Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, NATION 
(Dec. 12, 2014), https://www. thenation.com/article/prosecute-john-yoo-says-law-school-dean-
erwin-chemerinsky/ [ht tps://perma.cc/B6H5-BH5C]. 
 38.  Sam Stein, Lawrence Wilkerson: Disbar the Bush Lawyers and Get a Special 
Prosecutor for the Rest, HUFFINGTON POST (May 28, 2009), https://www.huffpost.com/ 
entry/lawrence-wilkerson-disbar_n_191755 [https://perma.cc/ Q4CP-XXNG].  
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university administrators, and bar associations” going forward.39 
But none of that ever happened. Instead, officials who held various roles in 
the torture program went on to obtain more powerful and more insulated positions 
in government, often with the support of elite Democratic lawyers. Consider the 
case of Judge Jay Bybee. Bybee was an Assistant Attorney General who authored 
a memo arguing that enhanced interrogation techniques did not amount to torture 
unless the officer using enhanced interrogation specifically intended to cause 
physical pain that is the “equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious 
physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even 
death.”40  The memo also maintained that Congress could not criminalize torture 
because  
the President’s powers as Commander in Chief gave the President the 
constitutional authority to torture people in some circumstances.41 
There were calls to punish Bybee for his role in authorizing the extreme and 
cruel treatment of detainees.42 But a year after he authored the memo, Bybee was 
nominated to be a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and 
 
 39.  Paul Campos, How to Torture the Bush Six, DAILY BEAST (July 14, 2017), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-to-torture-the-bush-six [https://perma.cc/QB7Z-3GU9]. 
 40.  Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney Gen. to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel 
to the President 1 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney 
Gen.], https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/ 886061/download [https://perma.cc/8YKE-YMNN]; 
On the Nomination PN4: Jay S. Bybee, of Nevada, to  
be United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, GOVTRACK (Mar. 13, 2003)  
[hereinafter On the Nomination PN4], http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ votes/108-2003/s54 
[https://perma.cc/82AE-347W]. 
 41.  Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney Gen., supra note 40, at 31–39. 
 42.  Martin Garbus, Disbar the Judge and the Lawyers, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 29, 
2014), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/disbar-alberto-gonzales-torture-memos_b_ 
6391986?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_ref
errer_sig=AQAAAE1FgDszBjN36j6MzaIWOj-RGUqsDW9xoewSwWcrWcCA 
sTQ8DIBaJ2MkJO0VRXgG7xA5XTayzirOQtu1rp9EbMAxYswchwGJ-hknsaoW02 
OZJDZjZ24levr23BrQ7XxBqhIdyBT6iT6WLouBaIA_va0IMrtT6Qec0S1wzfmritzP 
[https://perma.cc/4F2X-9FRB]; Hilzoy, Disbar Them, WASH. MONTHLY (May 6, 2009), 
https://washingtonmonthly.com/2009/05/06/disbar-them/ [https://perma.cc/N88R-PG NW]. 
Others called for him to be impeached. Bruce Ackerman, Impeach Jay Bybee, SLATE (Apr. 17, 
2009), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2009/04/the-case-for-impeaching-jay-bybee.html 
[https://perma.cc/6FQ5-F6YS]; Scott Horton, Impeach Jay Bybee, HARPER’S MAG. (Apr. 20, 
2009), https://harpers.org/blog/2009/04/impeach-jay-bybee/ [https://perma.cc/BQP7-Q2PQ]; 
John Nichols, Begin by Impeaching the Torture Judge, NATION (Apr. 19, 2009), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/begin-impeaching-torture-judge/ [https://perma.cc/SMW2-
M42N]; The Torturers’ Manifesto, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/19/opinion/19sun1.html?mtrref= 
undefined&gwh=CBB00CFD6179CDD5991BA821CF23D44D&gwt=pay. 
  
2020] Lawyers’ Democratic Dysfunction 311 
 
the Senate confirmed him by a 74–19 vote.43 The “yea” votes included 26 
Democratic senators, such as Senator Harry Reid (from Bybee’s home state of 
Nevada) and Senator Patrick Leahy, who was in charge of judicial nominations for 
the Democrats.44 The Senate received several letters in support of Bybee’s 
nomination from self-identified Democrats; the letters often leveraged the authors’ 
progressive credentials in support of Bybee’s nomination.45 The letter writers also 
stressed the  
authors’ membership in elite networks, such as academia.46 Bybee received letters 
of support from Stuart Green, a self-identified “liberal Democrat and active 
member of the ACLU,”47 and Democratic state senator Terry Care.48 The law firm 
Latham & Watkins later provided Bybee free legal services to support his defense 
on ethics charges.49 
Bybee is not the only federal judge involved in the Administration’s response 
to September 11. Justice Neil Gorsuch handled all terror litigation for the office of 
the Assistant Attorney General in the Bush Administration.50 In the course of that 
litigation, the office argued that the enhanced interrogation program was 
unchallengeable in court.51 During the  
 
 43.  On the Nomination PN4, supra note 40.  
 44.  Henry Weinstein, Conservative Confirmed as 9th Circuit Judge, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 14, 
2003), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-mar-14-me-bybee14-story.html. 
 45.  See, e.g., Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearings Before the  
Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. Senate, 108th Cong. 2–3 (2003) (statement from Orrin G. Hatch, 
Senator). 
 46.  See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 44. 
 47.  Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearings Before the Comm. on the 
Judiciary U.S. Senate, supra note 45, at 2–3. 
 48.  Id. at 195; Sen. Terry Care, NEV. APPEAL (Jan. 9, 2007), 
https://www.nevadaappeal.com/news/sen-terry-care/ [https://perma.cc/78X9-6CKX] 
(explaining Nevada state Senator Terry Care). 
 49.  Ian Millhiser, Corporate Law Firms Give Torture Judge Jay Bybee Over $3 Million 
in Free Legal Services, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 24, 2011), https://thinkprogress.org/corporate-
law-firms-give-torture-judge-jay-bybee-over-3-million-in-free-legal-services-ba1374e94eb0/ 
[https://perma.cc/86HW-QXPP]. Bybee was implicated in a 2009 report by the Office of 
Professional Responsibility, which could have resulted in his disbarment. Nick Baumann, OPR: 
Torture Lawyers Guilty of “Professional Misconduct”, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 19, 2010), 
https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2010/02/opr-torture-lawyers-guilty-professional-
misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/X24E-L5FD]. However, the Department of Justice refused to 
adopt the conclusions of the report in 2010. Id. 
 50.  Charlie Savage, Neil Gorsuch Helped Defend Disputed Bush-Era Terror Policies, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 2017/03/15/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-
torture-guantanamo-bay.html?ref=politics&_r=0 [hereinafter Savage, Gorsuch]. 
 51.  They argued, “[C]ourts should not undertake ‘the task of balancing individual rights 
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course of his tenure in the Executive Branch, Gorsuch added a notation that torture 
works on a memo about the Administration’s enhanced interrogation techniques52 
and put a big X next to a note about whether the Administration should apply the 
Geneva protections against torture to persons who were detained in connection 
with the war on terror.53 (The Administration would later unsuccessfully argue that 
the Geneva conventions should not apply to those detainees.)54 And after visiting 
Guantanamo Bay, Gorsuch wrote a letter saying he was “extraordinarily 
impressed” with the facilities and that the generals have “developed standards and 
imposed a degree of professionalism that the nation can be proud of.”55 
When Gorsuch was nominated to the Supreme Court, Neal Katyal, who 
argued and won one of the detainee-treatment cases, wrote an op-ed in the New 
York Times, urging the Senate to confirm Gorsuch.56 Katyal subsequently 
introduced Gorsuch in his confirmation hearing.57 Gorsuch’s former law clerks 
 
against national-security concerns’ unless the political branches . . . have determined that 
‘judicial oversight is appropriate.’” Defendant’s and the United States’ Motion to Dismiss, Ali 
v. Rumsfeld, 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 05-1378 (TFH)), 2006 WL 1032554, at 
*9. See Brief for Defendant-Appellants, Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 05-
4896-CV), 2005 WL 6237672, at *34–36 (“At a fundamental level, the district court’s opinion 
reflects an unwarranted reluctance to give weight to reasoned judgments of the Executive 
Branch regarding the risks associated with the disclosures about secret intelligence gathering 
activities. . . . To dismiss the carefully considered judgments presented by the government in 
this case as mere ‘speculation,’ and to replace those judgments with the court’s own conclusion 
that disclosure would not be harmful, is to make the judiciary rather than the Executive  
Branch the arbiter of this country’s intelligence gathering needs. That is a role the judiciary is 
institutionally unsuited to play.”).  
 52.  Robert Barnes & Ed O’Keefe, Senate Democrats Focus on Gorsuch’s Defense of 
Bush-Era Terrorism Policies, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.washington 
post.com/national/senate-democrats-focus-on-gorsuchs-defense-of-bush-era-terrorism-
policies/2017/03/15/3fced3de-0998-11e7-93dc-00f9bdd7 
4ed1_story.html?utm_term=.052123953456/. 
 53.  See Jennifer Daskal, Questions for Judge Gorsuch, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 16, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/38876/questions-judge-gorsuch/ [https://perma.cc/ BMS5-
L8MY]. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Letter from Neil M. Gorsuch to General Jay W. Hood (Nov. 17, 2005), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3522197-Gorsuch-DOJ-War-on-Terror-
Documents.html#document/p1 [https://perma.cc/4MJW-3LBW]. 
 56.  Neal Katyal, Why Liberals Should Back Neil Gorsuch, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/opinion/why-liberals-should-back-neil-
gorsuch.html?_r=0. 
 57.  Neal Katyal, Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ., Introduction of Judge Neil 
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wrote to the Senate on his behalf; the letter stressed that  
the clerks’ “political views span the spectrum, and among [them], you will  
find differing views on how the Senate handled the nomination of Judge Merrick 
Garland.”58 
It is important to caveat this case study by making clear what I am  
not saying: The lawyers involved in the torture programs were not  
bad lawyers, and their participation in the torture programs did not mean that they 
were incapable of principled decision-making. As a judge,  
Judge Jay Bybee has (correctly) ruled against the Trump Administration  
in a challenge to President Trump’s executive order that purports to prohibit 
migrants from asserting asylum claims if they do not enter the  
country through ports of entry.59 And Justice Gorsuch voted with his more liberal 
colleagues to form 5–4 majorities in several significant (though  
not high profile) criminal law and Native American law cases that were  
not otherwise particularly ideologically salient.60 
The lawyers’ participation in the torture programs is significant because it 
raises questions about whether there are certain actions  
that would disqualify elite lawyers from future government service  
in the eyes of their fellow lawyers.61 There were probably other competent, 
 
Gorsuch to the Senate Judiciary Committee (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.judiciary. 
senate.gov/download/03-20-17-katyal-introduction [https://perma.cc/D3YG-59KL]. 
 58.  David Lat, Liberals and Gays for Gorsuch? (Or, the Virtues of Non-Ideological Clerk 
Hiring), ABOVE L. (Feb. 15, 2017), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/02/liberals-and-gays-for-
gorsuch-or-the-virtues-of-non-ideological-clerk-hiring/2/ [https://perma.cc/ 7HXM-S5HE]. 
His female law clerks wrote a separate letter after a former student  
 
questioned his commitment to gender equity. Letter from Former Gorsuch Clerks, to Charles E. 
Grassley, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, and Dianne Feinstein, Ranking Member, Comm. 
on the Judiciary (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/ 
media/doc/Former%20Female%20Law%20Clerks.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BTR-PVCK]. 
 59.  E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 909 F.3d 1219, 1231 (9th Cir.), superseded by 
932 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2018).  
 60.  See, e.g., Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1688 (2019); Wash. State Dep’t of 
Licensing v. Cougar Den, 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1016 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); United States 
v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2372 (2019); United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2322 
(2019); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1233–34 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  
 61.  For a comparison, consider what several Democratic nominees have been punished 
for. Dawn Johnsen’s nomination to the Office of Legal Counsel was withdrawn after her 
arguments in support of a woman’s constitutional right to end a pregnancy came under critical 
scrutiny. Charlie Savage, Obama Nominee to Legal Office Withdraws, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 
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principled Republicans who did not participate in or enable the United  
 
 
States’ torture program who could have been selected as nominees.62 But the 
lawyers’ participation in the torture program was not viewed as disqualifying, 
including by the other elite lawyers who continued to support them.63 
The elite network of lawyers may not ultimately have the power  
to sway senators’ votes on a particular nominee. But bipartisan support provides 
senators cover to vote for a nominee, especially relative  
to nominations that involve polarized opposition and criticism.64 Bipartisan 
support also minimizes the time, resources, and political capital  
that an administration or a vulnerable senator would have to devote to  
 
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/10/us/politics/10johnsen.html? 
mtrref=en.wikipedia.org&gwh=258D635098F562B7B69B1B12992E1ECB&gwt=pay&asset
Type=REGIWALL – Dawn Johnsen. Debo Adegbile’s nomination to the Justice Department’s 
Civil Rights Division was withdrawn because of his pro bono work on behalf of a criminal 
defendant. See Josh Gerstein, Obama’s Civil Rights Nominee Withdraws, POLITICO (Sept. 15, 
2014), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2014/09/obamas-civil-rights-nominee-
withdraws-195512 [https://perma.cc/EFN8-QZCB]. 
 62.  There were certainly less competent and less principled people to nominate for these 
positions who did not participate in or enable the United States’ torture program.  
Natasha Bertrand, Gina Haspel’s Lose-Lose Proposition for Democrats, ATLANTIC (May 7, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/05/gina-haspels-lose-lose-
proposition-for-democrats/559826/ (noting Democrats’ fears in the context of Gina Haspel). 
Gina Haspel, for example, was confirmed as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 
Miriam Khan, Senate Votes to Confirm Gina Haspel as Next CIA Director, ABC NEWS (May 
17, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/senate-votes-confirm-gina-hospel-cia-
director/story?id=55240031 [https://perma.cc/E8M5-XBST]. “Haspel oversaw a CIA black site 
in Thailand where two terrorism suspects were tortured, and her name was on a cable that 
ordered the videotapes of their interrogations to be destroyed in 2005.” Bertrand, supra. Fifty-
four Senators voted for her confirmation, including Democratic Senators Mark Warner and 
Jeanne Shaheen. Khan, supra. Jeremy Bash, the “Democratic chief counsel to the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and chief of staff at the CIA and the Department 
of Defense under President Obama,” penned an op-ed in support of her nomination. Jeremy 
Bash, Gina Haspel Is the Rare CIA Director Nominee That Both Parties Should Love, NBC 
(May 2, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/gina-haspel-rare-cia-director-
nominee-both-parties-should-love-ncna870716 [https://perma.cc/2MYX-ZB73]. But some 
Democrats feared the prospect of a CIA director who lacked any training in intelligence and 
was merely a friend of the President. See Bertrand, supra. 
 63.  See supra notes 43–58.  
 64.  Patrick Gregory, Trump’s First Black Female Judicial Nominee a Bipartisan Pick, 
BLOOMBERG L. (May 20, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/trumps-first-
black-female-judicial-nominee-a-bipartisan-pick [https://perma.cc/ 5JSD-Q4LT]. 
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a particular nominee.65 And at a minimum, the networks could impose  
the social cost of a  lack  of  support  from  one’s  own  social  and  professional  
network. Some administrations even rely on particular networks to  
 
identify nominees for positions,66 which means the networks can decide  
what disqualifies someone from future appointments.  
III. FAMILY SEPARATIONS 
The case studies of the officials involved in the enhanced interrogation 
program raise questions about whether any Trump Administration official will 
suffer long-term professional costs for participating in or defending the 
Administration’s forcible separation of families, among other policies. 
By now, the contours of the Administration’s family-separation policy are 
clear. President Trump and then-Chief of Staff John Kelly, together with then-
Attorney General Jeff Sessions, publicly floated the prospect of forcibly separating 
families in order to deter migrants from attempting to enter the United States 
(including migrants who are entitled to asylum).67 The Administration ultimately 
chose to institute a “zero tolerance” policy to effectuate family separations and 
deter migration.68 Under the zero tolerance policy, the Administration criminally 
prosecuted anyone who crossed the border (including persons whose asylum 
claims had not yet been processed or rejected).69 
The zero tolerance policy resulted in family separations because the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) conducts criminal prosecutions rather than the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which polices the border and detains 
 
 65.  See, e.g., id. (noting how Democratic support from outside the Senate will ease burden 
of judicial confirmation). 
 66.  See LEVINSON & BALKIN, supra note 3, at 131; Dylan Matthews & Byrd Pinkerton, 
The Incredible Influence of the Federalist Society, Explained, VOX (June 3, 2019), 
https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/6/3/18632438/federalist-society-leonard -leo-brett-
kavanaugh [https://perma.cc/UN7U-NARF]; Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Shawn Boburg, A 
Conservative Activist’s Behind-the-Scenes Campaign to Remake the Nation’s Courts, WASH. 
POST (May 21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ graphics/2019/investigations/leonard-
leo-federalists-society-courts/; What Is the Federal Society and How Does It Affect Supreme 
Court Picks?, NPR (June 28, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/28/624416666/what-is-the-
federalist-society-and-how-does-it-affect-supreme-court-picks [https://perma.cc/C898-47VU].  
 67.  See id. (cataloguing evidence of the Trump Administration’s consideration of its 
family-separation policy). 
 68.  Leah Litman & Hilary Robin Rosenthal, Immigration Policy Parallels, TAKE CARE 
(May 20, 2019), http://takecareblog.com/blog/immigration-policy-parallels. 
 69.  Id.  
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persons during the course of immigration proceedings.70 The  
criminal prosecutions therefore “separated” parents from their children  
because the parents were (temporarily) placed in the custody of the DOJ while 
their children remained in the custody of the DHS.71 The Administration 
maintained that when the DOJ took a parent into its custody (and out of DHS 
custody), the parent’s child became legally “unaccompanied,” since the child was 
in DHS custody and the parent was not.72 Under the relevant statutes, an 
unaccompanied minor must be placed in the custody of the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement (ORR), which is within the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS), rather than the DHS.73 As a result, once the parent returned to 
DHS custody (even after only a brief time in DOJ custody), the parent and child 
would be separated and in the custody of two different government agencies.74 
In other writings, I have debunked the argument that children who cross the 
border with their parents are unaccompanied for purposes of         the relevant 
statutes that would allow ORR to take custody of them.75 Other legal scholars have 
likewise discredited other arguments that the  
Administration is making in support of family separations.76 District courts have 
 
 70.  See id.  
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. This included even temporary changes in custody, such as when the parent attended 
a hearing on the unlawful-entry charge or was being transported to that bearing. Id. The 
Administration also maintained that placing a parent in DHS custody meant a child was 
unaccompanied. See Marty Lederman, Deborah Pearlstein & Ryan Goodman, Unpacking 
DOJ’s New Claim That DHS Can Legally Detain Migrant Children with Their Parents for 
Longer than Twenty Days, JUST SECURITY (July 6, 2018), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/59046/unpacking-dojs-claim-dhs-legally-detain-migrant-
children-parents-longer-twenty-days/ [https://perma.cc/GBP8-WZ98].  
 73.  About the Program, OFF. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ 
orr/programs/ucs/about [https://perma.cc/W9ZF-N557]; Leah Litman, How Trump Corrupts 
the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2018) [hereinafter Litman, How Trump Corrupts the 
Rule of Law], https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/ opinion/trump-zero-tolerance-
border.html. 
 74.  Litman, How Trump Corrupts the Rule of Law, supra note 73.  
 75.  Id.; Leah Litman, Forced Separation of Families & Forced to-Term Pregnancies, 
TAKE CARE (June 7, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/forced-separation-of-families-and-
forced-to-term-pregnancies; Leah Litman, Immigration Sins of the Past & the Forced 
Separation of Families, TAKE CARE (June 4, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/ 
immigration-sins-of-the-past-and-the-forced-separation-of-families; Leah Litman, Law and 
Farce: The Forced Separation of Families, TAKE CARE (June 5, 2018), 
https://takecareblog.com/blog/law-and-farce-the-forced-separation-of-families. 
 76.  Marty Lederman, Deborah Pearlstein & Ryan Goodman, Unpacking DOJ’s New 
Claim That DHS Can Legally Detain Migrant Children with Their Parents for Longer than 
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issued compelling and scathing opinions finding the Administration’s family 
separations unlawful.77 Even if the family separations are lawful, however, there 
is no serious question of whether they affect serious and long-term psychological 
and emotional costs on the families who are separated (even temporarily). 
There have been calls to punish or shun any government official involved in 
the moral travesty of family separations.78 In light of what happened to the officials 
involved in the torture program, that probably will not happen.79 Some protesters 
may occasionally yell at Kirstjen Nielsen in restaurants.80 But that will stop at some 
point. 
Indeed, there are already signs that the lawyers involved in the forced 
separation of families will be welcomed back into the fold. One of the lawyers 
involved in family separations has already been promoted.81 Before he was 
confirmed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Judge Chad Readler 
was the Assistant Attorney General whose name is on all of the briefs defending 
the forced separation of families.82 The vote to confirm Readler was along party 
lines.83  But elite lawyers did not uniformly oppose  
Readler,84 and his defense of the forced separation of families was  
 
Twenty Days, JUST SECURITY (July 6, 2018), https:// www.justsecurity.org/  
59046/unpacking-dojs-claim-dhs-legally-detain-migrant-children-parents-longer-twenty -
days/ [https://perma.cc/9BSE-T643]. 
 77.  Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1144 (S.D. Cal. 
2018) (“The unfortunate reality is that under the present system migrant children are not 
accounted for with the same efficiency and accuracy as property. Certainly, that cannot satisfy 
the requirements of due process.”). 
 78.  Michelle Goldberg, Cancel Kirstjen Nielsen, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2019), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2019/04/08/opinion/kirstjen-nielsen-family-separation-trump.html. 
 79.  See supra Part II. 
 80.  Sarah Mervosh, Kirstjen Nielsen Is Confronted by Protesters at Mexican Restaurant: 
‘Shame!’, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 2018/06/20/us/kirstjen-
nielsen-protesters-restaurant.html. 
 81.  See, e.g., Roll Call Vote 116th Congress-1st Session, U.S. SENATE (Mar. 6, 2019), 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=116&
session=1&vote=00037 [https://perma.cc/YV6S-6YGP]. 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id. Susan Collins was apparently allowed to cast an inconsequential no. See id. 
 84.  See, e.g., Eric Heisig, Abortions, the Muslim Ban and Other Controversial Cases of 
Trump’s Ohio Nominees for a Federal Appeals Court, CLEVELAND.COM (June 18,  
2018), https://www.cleveland.com/news/erry-2018/06/7003c9e82e5691/abortions_the_ 
muslim_ban_and_o.html [https://perma.cc/Z7G6-ZKM6] (“‘We say all parties under our legal 
system are entitled to balanced representation. That requires attorneys that are willing to take 
positions they do or do not agree with,’ Adler said. ‘The system can’t work if we assume that 
attorneys agree with their clients.’”).  
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not enough to disqualify him from a judicial appointment with lifetime tenure.85 
IV. LAWYERS AND DEMOCRATIC DYSFUNCTION 
The idea that elite lawyers should professionally sanction other elite lawyers 
who participate in the breakdown of important constitutional norms involves 
difficult line-drawing issues. Of course lawyers should not be penalized for 
defending any policy that pushes a line or that attempts to change the law. And of 
course lawyers should not demonize other lawyers merely because they disagree 
on some issues. 
But some things have to be enough to warrant approbation, even within the 
network of elite lawyers. Lawyers are already sanctioned for myriad things that 
they do in the course of being a lawyer. Lawyers cannot suborn perjury.86 They 
cannot conceal evidence.87 They cannot commit securities fraud, even in the course 
of representing a client.88 And that is just a partial list.89 So it is not as if lawyers 
get a pass for anything they might do in the course of representing a client. 
Why is enabling racist and cruel family separations not on the prohibited list 
of actions? Why does enabling family separations not suffice as a reason to 
disqualify someone from future government service? The Administration’s 
 
 85.  Readler was also involved in some of the Administration’s other legally questionable 
policies. He defended the Administration’s ability to prevent undocumented minor women in 
its custody from having abortions (even when the women became pregnant as a result of rape 
and threatened to harm themselves if they could not have an abortion). Defendant’s Motion for 
Briefing on Class Wide Relief and Stay Pending Supreme Court Proceedings, Garza v. Hargan, 
No. 17-CV-02122 (TSC) (D.D.C. Nov. 3, 2017); see generally Garza v. Hargan, C.R. LITIG. 
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16228 [https://perma.cc/6474-
BDDN] (providing links to other briefs signed by Readler in the Garza case). He also made 
both the claim that the now-unenforceable minimum coverage requirement is unconstitutional 
and the legally outlandish claim that the rest of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) must be 
invalidated as a result. Fed. Defendants’ Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs’ Application 
for Preliminary Injunction, Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (No. 
4:18-cv-00167-O), 2018 WL 2750077. Readler’s participation in the ACA litigation, and not 
his facilitation of the forced separation of families, apparently caused Senator Susan Collins 
(R–ME) to cast her inconsequential vote against his confirmation. See Senator Collins to 
Oppose Administration’s Judicial Nominee to 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, SUSAN COLLINS: 
U.S. SENATOR ME. (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.collins.senate.gov/newsroom/senator-collins-
oppose-administration %E2%80%99s-judicial-nominee-6th-circuit-court-appeals 
[https://perma.cc/U5NA-4AY9]. 
 86.  See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).  
 87.  Id. at r. 3.4. 
 88.  See id. at r. 1.6. 
 89.  See id. 
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forcible separation of families has little basis in the law, it has no appreciable 
deterrent effect on border crossings, and, most importantly, it works unspeakable 
pain and cruelty on the individuals affected.90   
If lawyers are not even willing to speak out against lawyers who are involved 
in the forced separation of families, then they will not speak out against lawyers 
who are involved in less morally abhorrent policies that nonetheless facilitate 
significant breakdowns in our constitutional order. Think of other policies that 
lawyers have been involved in because of their service in the Trump 
Administration. Lawyers were involved in allegedly covering up the purpose of 
adding a citizenship question to the census;91 lawyers continue to serve in an 
Administration that threatens to prosecute its political opponents and 
“send . . . back” a black, American  
congresswoman who is a naturalized citizen and refugee;92 lawyers continue to 
serve after the President maintained that there were “very fine” people on the neo-
Nazi side of a Charlottesville rally that killed a young woman;93 lawyers continue 
to serve after the President questioned the assessments of the intelligence 
 
 90.  In fiscal year 2018, Customs and Border Protection apprehended 396,579 individuals 
crossing the southwestern border. Total Illegal Alien Apprehension by Fiscal Year, U.S. 
CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/ 
assets/documents/2019-Mar/bp-southwest-border-sector-apps-fy1960-fy2018.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/4Y2E-JDNN]. Only 10 months into fiscal year 2019, Customs and Border Protection 
had already apprehended 760,370 individuals crossing the southwestern border. Southwest 
Border Migration FY 2019, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, 
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration/fy-2019 [https://perma.cc/ ZXQ6-
5DFV]. 
 91.  See, e.g., Hansi Lo Wang, Trump Officials Face Cover-up Allegations After Failed 
Citizenship Question Push, NPR (July 16, 2019), https://www.npr.org/ 
2019/07/16/742259233/trump-officials-face-cover-up-allegations-after-failed-citizenship-
question-push [https://perma.cc/BS4Y-CPVQ]. Some government lawyers seemed willing to 
disavow the government’s prior representations in court about the timing of the census. Hansi 
Lo Wang, Judge Says Administration Can’t Change Lawyers in Census Citizenship Question 
Case, NPR (July 7, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/07/ 739369416/justice-department-
changes-legal-team-behind-census-citizenship-question-case [https://perma.cc/HPG4-JSYN]. 
 92.  Rebecca Morin, Ilhan Omar Trolls Trump with Tweet About Africa Visit, Weeks After 
‘Send Her Back’ Chant, USA TODAY (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/politics/2019/08/01/send-her-back-ilhan-omar-trolls-trump-post-africa-visit/ 
1895486001/; Jonathan Allen, Trump Turns the Full Force of the Government on Perceived 
Political Enemies, NBC NEWS (May 24, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/ politics/white-
house/trump-turns-full-force-government-perceived-political-enemies-n1010096 
[https://perma.cc/MQ36-WSPZ]. 
 93.  See Rosie Gray, Trump Defends White-Nationalist Protestors: ‘Some Very Fine 
People on Both Sides’, ATLANTIC (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 
archive/2017/08/trump-defends-white-nationalist-protesters-some-very-fine-people-on-both-
sides/537012/. 
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community about Russia’s interference in the election;94 lawyers continue to serve 
after the President took various actions to undermine the counterintelligence 
investigation into Russian interference in the election;95 lawyers continue to serve 
after the President described a variety of African, South American, and Central 
American countries as “shithole countries” (and restricted immigration from those 
countries),96 and so on. 
Lawyers have also (reportedly) been involved in covering up President 
Trump’s serious, antidemocratic breaches of his constitutional obligations and 
office. After the President asked the Ukrainian President to investigate his political 
opponent’s son, lawyers directed White House officials to place records of the call 
on secret, classified servers—even though the call contained no classified 
information.97 The call merely contained something that was politically 
embarrassing to the President and deeply destructive to our constitutional 
democracy.98 Apparently, White House lawyers sought to keep secret several other 
presidential conversations, including one in which  
the President told the Russian government that he was fine with their interference 
in the 2016 election, which benefited him.99 
Lawyers can communicate their opposition to government misconduct 
through noisy withdrawals or resignations.100 But there were no withdrawals or 
resignations when the Administration started separating families. Nor were there 
 
 94.  See Peter Baker & Michael Crowley, Trump and Putin Share Joke About Election 
Meddling, Sparking New Furor, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/28/us/politics/trump-putin-election.html. 
 95.  2 SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO 
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 3–7 (Mar. 
2019), https://www.justice.gov/storage/report_volume2.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5AL-SWJ8]. 
 96.  See Eli Watkins & Abby Phillip, Trump Decries Immigrants from ‘Shithole Countries’ 
Coming to US, CNN (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/ 2018/01/11/politics/immigrants-
shithole-countries-trump/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 7LJ8-4JUV]. 
 97.  Letter from Whistleblower, supra note 30.  
 98.  See id.  
 99.  Shane Harris, Josh Dawsey & Ellen Nakashima, Trump Told Russian Officials in 2017 
He Wasn’t Concerned About Moscow’s Interference in U.S. Election, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-told-russian-officials-in-
2017-he-wasnt-concerned-about-moscows-interference-in-us-election/2019/ 09/27/b20a8bc8-
e159-11e9-b199-f638bf2c340f_story.html. 
 100.  See C. Ryan Barber, ‘A Very Difficult Time’: Challenges for Career Lawyers at 
Trump’s DOJ, LAW.COM (July 15, 2019), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/ 
2019/07/15/a-very-difficult-time-challenges-for-career-lawyers-at-trumps-doj/ [https:// 
perma.cc/P7AF-RBZ5]; Josh Gerstein, Justice Department Attorney Resigns After Legal Shift 
on Obamacare, POLITICO (June 12, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/ 
06/12/obamacare-justice-department-resign-642992 [https://perma.cc/SY2J-NKTZ].  
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withdrawals after the President praised the neo-Nazi side of a rally at which a 
young woman was killed. And if going along with the destruction of whatever 
norm there was against supporting neo-Nazis does not carry any consequences, 
then there will probably not be any consequences when lawyers help break down 
more seemingly mundane and procedural norms that are nonetheless important to 
the orderly functioning of a system of constitutional government. Lawyers are 
challenging the idea that presidents can be investigated for breaking the law101 and 
are allegedly helping the President cover up potentially impeachable conduct,102 
among other things. 
When critics accuse lawyers of enabling government misconduct, one 
common defense is to insist there is space between the lawyer’s views and the 
client’s.103 It is true, of course, that government lawyers do not necessarily believe 
all of the positions they argue for as government lawyers, and it is also important 
to ensure that the government is vigorously represented. But there is no norm in 
the United States that lawyers must accept every client who approaches them, at 
least outside the context of criminal defense.104 Nor is there a norm that lawyers 
must advance every argument in support of a client or defend every decision their 
client wants (again, outside the context of criminal defense and in the particular 
setting of civil government representation).105 
There are, by contrast, norms (and even bar rules) to that effect in other 
countries. The United Kingdom generally requires lawyers to accept professional 
clients’ instructions under the “cab-rank” rule.106 Under that rule, if a lawyer 
“receive[s] instructions from a professional client”107 and the “instructions are 
appropriate taking into account” the lawyer’s “experience, seniority, and/or field 
 
 101.  See, e.g., Igor Derysh, Trump’s New Argument: He’s Immune from All Criminal 
Investigation in New Tax Return Lawsuit, SALON (Sept. 21, 2019, 11:00 AM), 
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 102.  Harris, Dawsey & Nakashima, supra note 99; Letter from Whistleblower, supra note 
30. 
 103.  See Savage, Gorsuch, supra note 50.  
 104.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.18 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1983). 
 105.  See id. at r. 3.1, 3.3. 
 106.  BAR STANDARDS BD., THE BAR STANDARDS HANDBOOK 44 (4th ed. 2019).  
 107.  A professional client is any client in a regulated industry. Id. at 247. This encompasses 
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of practice,” then the lawyer “must . . . accept the instructions, irrespective of” the 
client’s identity, the nature of the case, whether the client is paying privately or 
publicly, or “any belief or opinion” the lawyer has regarding “the character, 
reputation, cause, conduct, guilt or innocence of the client.”108 A lawyer can only 
refuse when there is one of the following: a conflict of interest, a likelihood of 
breaching client confidentiality, an instruction to go against the law or code of 
ethics, a conflicting prior commitment, a potential liability for professional 
negligence that exceeds the scope of the amount available under malpractice 
insurance, a client that will not pay, a client that represents an unreasonable credit 
risk, or a belief that the lawyer cannot competently represent the client.109 
The United States has no similar rule. Outside the criminal context, lawyers 
can choose whether to represent particular clients.110 Nothing  
obligates lawyers to provide their services to anyone who asks for them, and 
nothing obligates lawyers to continue with particular representations or follow 
through with particular client directives.111 
At some point, it probably should not matter if the lawyers who are enabling 
the forcible separation of families or helping the President invite foreign 
interference in an election would personally like to see those things happen. What 
matters is that they are making it easier for those things to happen. Their 
professional skills and credentials are being leveraged to defend those policies, and 
their presence in government gives the government’s policies more credibility and 
authority than they would otherwise have. 
Most importantly, if we do not want families to be separated, detainees to be 
tortured, or foreign governments interfering in our elections, then there need to be 
professional costs for the people who help the government do those things—
including losing out on the opportunity for future government appointments. That 
is how deterrence works: There is a penalty for engaging in certain conduct, and 
that penalty deters others from doing the same thing. Here, it would mean that 
when you abuse a government office, you do not get to be in government office 
 
 108.  BAR STANDARDS BD., supra note 106, at 44 (emphasis added) (citing rule rC29, the 
cab-rank rule). 
 109.  Id. at 38, 39, 44, 45. 
 110.  See Duncan Kennedy, The Responsibility of Lawyers for the Justice of Their Causes, 
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again.112 
Of course, there is something painful and unpleasant about making life 
uncomfortable for someone familiar, especially a professional colleague. There is 
also something deeply uncomfortable about calling out someone you know for 
immoral conduct. But our constitutional order depends on people doing just that. 
Scholars have identified professional networks as important guardians of norms: 
Government officials and elites abide by norms in part because they fear 
approbation or repudiation by their professional and social networks if they do 
not.113 Yet those networks are now sending the signal that their members have 
nothing to fear at all—because they will never be held accountable for participating 
in cruel and destructive policies.114 
That does not mean elite lawyers’ support for one another caused the 
dysfunction that Balkin and Levinson observe.115 Elite lawyers supported each 
other’s careers before the rise of the kind of dysfunction that Balkin and Levinson 
document. But the state of the legal profession makes lawyers unable or unwilling 
to stop the kind of dysfunction they observe; instead, the lawyers contribute to it. 
In particular, lawyers’ seemingly boundless commitment to supporting lawyers on 
both sides, and the related commitment to giving lawyers a pass for what they do 
in government, may be just fine when neither side is arguing for morally abhorrent 
policies or the destruction of democratic processes. But those commitments have 
pernicious effects when one side, while in government office, seeks to make 
 
 112.  Cf. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation 
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 114.  See supra Part II. 
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elections less democratic and to carry out the separation of families.116 
The idea that there is something untoward about calling someone a racist or 
a fascist117 appears in constitutional jurisprudence as well as in the behavior of 
lawyers.118 And if it is concerning in constitutional jurisprudence (as many scholars 
have suggested it is), then it should be concerning in the behavior of networks 
too.119 Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. 
Holder.120 Shelby County invalidated the statutory provision that gave life to 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which required states with histories of 
racial discrimination to preclear any changes to their voting laws.121 The Court 
invalidated the VRA provision in part because of the Court’s apparent misgivings 
about being too hard on the U.S. South for its history of state-sponsored terrorism 
and violence against racial minorities.122 The Court has also limited federal courts’ 
ability to oversee the desegregation of public schools on the ground that it is unfair 
to hold districts responsible for actions that occurred more than a decade ago (the 
time it takes one child to complete elementary through high school).123 And the 
Court has created an extremely high threshold for concluding government officials 
discriminated on the basis of race,124 emphasizing the need to presume that states 
are acting out of good motives, since a conclusion that they acted out of bad 
 
 116.  See, e.g., David Pozen, The Shrinking Constitution of Settlement, BALKINIZATION 
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motives would be unfairly harsh.125 
These judicial decisions have the same untoward effects as the networks’ 
unwillingness to sanction lawyers who engage in norm-breaking conduct. That is 
why scholars have identified these decisions as cause for concern: By making it 
difficult to call out government officials who participate in the destruction or 
violation of any given norm, these decisions, together with the elite network of 
lawyers, protect government officials who participate in the destruction of norms 
that are integral to a healthy constitutional democracy.  
The judicial decisions that express concern about identifying government 
officials as racist provide some reasons for their reluctance, such as the limited 
fact-finding capacity of the federal courts, the federal courts’ relative expertise in 
certain areas, or the judicial deference that is due to the political branches.126 But 
these justifications do not explain why professional and social networks are 
unwilling to hold their members responsible for facilitating the breakdown of some 
constitutional norm. And the networks’ failure to hold their members accountable 
is just as bad for our constitutional order as the federal courts’ unwillingness to 
call out racism or other antidemocratic actions. By eliminating one important 
mechanism for policing norms, the unconditional loyalty within the elite network 
of lawyers contributes to the kind of dysfunction that Balkin and Levinson’s book 
concerns.127 
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